Epilepsy surgery is the most effective therapeutic approach for children with drug resistant epilepsy. Recent advances in neurosurgery, such as the Laser Interstitial Thermal Therapy, improved the safety and non-invasiveness of this method. Electric and magnetic source imaging plays critical role in the delineation of the epileptogenic focus during the presurgical evaluation of children with DRE. Yet, they are currently underutilized even in tertiary epilepsy centers. Here, we present a case of an adolescent who suffered from DRE for 16 years (...) and underwent surgery at Cook Children's Medical Center. The patient was previously evaluated in a level 4 epilepsy center and treated with multiple antiseizure medications for several years. Presurgical evaluation at CCMC included long-term video electroencephalography, magnetoencephalography with simultaneous conventional EEG and high-density EEG in two consecutive sessions, MRI, and fluorodeoxyglucose - positron emission tomography. Video long-term EEG captured nine focal-onset clinical seizures with a maximal evolution over the right frontal/frontal midline areas. MRI was initially interpreted as non-lesional. FDG-PET revealed a small region of hypometabolism at the anterior right superior temporal gyrus. ESI and MSI performed with dipole clustering showed a tight cluster of dipoles in the right anterior insula. The patient underwent intracranial EEG which indicated the right anterior insular as seizure onset zone. Eventually LITT rendered the patient seizure free. Retrospective analysis of ESI and MSI clustered dipoles found a mean distance of dipoles from the ablated volume ranging from 10 to 25 mm. Our findings highlight the importance of recent technological advances in the presurgical evaluation and surgical treatment of children with DRE, and the underutilization of epilepsy surgery in children with DRE. (shrink)

I present an argument for a sophisticated version of sceptical invariantism that has so far gone unnoticed: Bifurcated Sceptical Invariantism (BSI). I argue that it can, on the one hand, (dis)solve the Gettier problem, address the dogmatism paradox and, on the other hand, show some due respect to the Moorean methodological incentive of ‘saving epistemic appearances’. A fortiori, BSI promises to reap some other important explanatory fruit that I go on to adduce (e.g. account for concessive knowledge attributions). BSI can (...) achieve this much because it distinguishes between two distinct but closely interrelated (sub)concepts of (propositional) knowledge, fallible-but-safe knowledge and infallible-and-sensitive knowledge, and explains how the pragmatics and the semantics of knowledge discourse operate at the interface of these two (sub)concepts of knowledge. I conclude that BSI is a novel theory of knowledge discourse that merits serious investigation. (shrink)

O presente artigo mostra de que modo Damascius ao usar os termos 'Ενωσις (União) e Διάκρισις (Distinção) procura provar que o mundo metafísico não se encontra numa posição absolutamente estável e imóvel. O artigo mostra de que modo os termos acima mencionados são correlativos às categorias Ταυτόν (Idêntico) e Έτερον (Diferente), bem como a existência de uma relação entre a imobilidade e a diferenciação. Mais especificamente, ao usar o termo União, Damascius demonstra que as entidades metafísicas superiores que é o (...) "en" e seus efeitos são idênticos sem qualquer sinal de diferenciação. Por outro lado, mostra-se também o modo como Damascius ao usar o termo Distinção está tentando ilustrar o modo como estas entidades causam o início da diferenciação. Mas um tal modo de apresentação do mundo metafísico parece preservar inalteráveis as particularidades iniciais e ao mesmo tempo constitui os termos para os processos produtivos subsequentes. Mediante a consideração destes últimos, o artigo mostra como, segundo Damascius, um ponto de vista dinâmico é passível de ser considerado no momento de descrever e de interpretar a essência e a função do mundo metafísico. /// By using the terms 'Ενωσις (Union) and Διάκρισις (Distinction) Damascius attempts to prove that the metaphysical world is not in an absolutely stable and immobile position. In his work these aforementioned terms correlate with the categories Ταυτόν (Identical) and Έτερον (Different) and it is asserted that there is a relation between the immobility and differentiation. More specifically, by using the term Union, Damascius demonstrates that the superior metaphysical entities that are the "en" and its generating potentials are identical without any single sign of differentiation. On the other hand, by using the term Distinction he is trying to illustrate the way in which these entities cause the beginning of the differentiation. This double way of presenting the metaphysical world appears to preserve the initial particularities unalterable and at the same time to constitute the terms of the productive procedures. Through the latter a dynamic viewpoint is hereby presented concerning the description and the interpretation of the essence and the function of the metaphysical world. (shrink)

Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) argued that there are moral conceptual truths that are substantive in content, what they called ‘moral fixed points’. I argue that insofar as we have some reason to postulate moral fixed points, we have equal reason to postulate epistemic fixed points (e.g. the factivity condition). To this effect, I show that the two basic reasons Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) offer in support of moral fixed points naturally carry over to epistemic fixed points. In particular, epistemic fixed (...) points exhibit the four ‘marks’ of conceptual truths that they identify and can be utilized to address important challenges to epistemic realism. I conclude that insofar as we have some reason to postulate moral fixed points, we have equal reason to postulate epistemic fixed points. -/- . (shrink)

I stipulate and motivate the overlooked problem of demarcating radical skeptics (perceptual and moral) from mentally disordered persons, given that both deny that they know ordinary Moorean propositions (e.g., that they have hands or that killing for fun is morally wrong). Call this ‘the demarcation problem’. In response to the demarcation problem, I develop a novel way to demarcate between mentally disordered persons and radical skeptics in an extensionally adequate way that saves the appearance that radical skeptics are not mentally (...) disordered persons (at least not typically). Finally, I examine how a Moorean, non-skeptical epistemologist would compare radical skeptics with the mentally disordered in terms of what Plantinga calls internal and external rationality. Perhaps surprisingly, by Moorean lights, the mentally disordered fare better than the radical skeptic in terms of (internal) rationality. The upshot is that for Mooreans skeptical philosophy is more of an epistemic evil than mental disorder. (shrink)

In Metaphysics E. 3. 1027a29–30 Aristotle states that there are some causes, the incidental ones, that are generable and destructible but they have no coming to be. Furthermore, he asserts that if we deny this thesis, then we will have to give into determinism . There are three persistent puzzles surrounding this chapter. First, what does it mean to say that a cause is generable and destructible but it has no coming to be? Second, what exactly is the connection between (...) this claim and determinism? And third, if we accept that in Metaphysics E. 3 Aristotle deals with incidental causation, then how is this discussion related to the treatment of incidentalness in E. 2? This article puts forward answers for these puzzles. I argue that there is textual evidence in Physics II. 5 that shows that the claim in Metaphysics 1027a29–30 is meant to capture the non-teleological nature of incidental causation. Moreover, I argue that this same textual evidence indicates that the thesis expressed at Metaphysics 1027a29–30 is in effect Aristotle’s response to teleological determinism. Finally, I suggest that it is plausible to suppose that chapter 3 does not quite belong with the rest of Metaphysics E. (shrink)

In Metaphysics E. 3. 1027a29–30 Aristotle states that there are some causes, the incidental ones, that are generable and destructible but they have no coming to be. Furthermore, he asserts that if we deny this thesis, then we will have to give into determinism (1027a30–32). There are three persistent puzzles surrounding this chapter. First, what does it mean to say that a cause is generable and destructible but it has no coming to be? Second, what exactly is the connection between (...) this claim and determinism? And third, if we accept that in Metaphysics E. 3 Aristotle deals with incidental causation, then how is this discussion related to the treatment of incidentalness in E. 2? This article puts forward answers for these puzzles. I argue that there is textual evidence in Physics II. 5 that shows that the claim in Metaphysics 1027a29–30 is meant to capture the non-teleological nature of incidental causation. Moreover, I argue that this same textual evidence indicates that the thesis expressed at Metaphysics 1027a29–30 is in effect Aristotle’s response to teleological determinism. Finally, I suggest that it is plausible to suppose that chapter 3 does not quite belong with the rest of Metaphysics E. (shrink)

Ingram (2015) has argued that Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s (2014) ‘moral fixed points’ theory entails that error theorists are conceptually deficient with moral concepts. They are conceptually deficient with moral concepts because they do not grasp moral fixed points (e.g. ‘Torture for fun is pro tanto wrong’). Ingram (2015) concluded that moral fixed points theory cannot substantiate the conceptual deficiency charge and, therefore, the theory is defeated. In defense of moral fixed points theory, Kyriacou (2017a) argued that the theory is coherent (...) with the error theorists being conceptually competent with moral concepts, while reflectively denying moral fixed points theory. This is because error theorists could be conceptually competent with moral concepts but, due to intellectual vices, be swayed by unsound arguments against moral fixed points theory. Ingram (2018) replied to Kyriacou (2017a) that the intellectual vice charge against error theorists cannot be substantiated and, therefore, the moral fixed points theory is still defeated. In this paper, I argue that the possibility of intellectual vice is independently plausible and sufficient to undermine Ingram’s argument against the moral fixed points theory. (shrink)

This paper attempts at showing the basic principles according to which the Neoplatonist philosopher Proclus formulated his theory on time. The argumentation basically focuses on his methodology, since whatever is included in this analysis is used by the Neoplatonist philosopher in almost all his references to the notion of time. His basic position is that time is not simply a cosmological factor, but possesses properties which connect it closely with the metaphysical world. Also, that it is essential to examine its (...) relation with the Soul, as an ontological factor which connects the metaphysical with the natural world, and that this examination is necessary, so that the production of the natural world can be clarified with due exactness. The topics dealt with are included in Proclus’ treatise In Platonis Timaeum, i.e. his extensive commentary on the Platonic dialogue Timaeus, on the basis of the new scientific and philosophical finds, which had became available since the time of Plato. (shrink)

In this paper, we advocate the usage of the family of Heyting-valued modal logics, introduced by M. Fitting, by presenting a simple 3-valued modal language and axiomatizing an interesting 3-valued logic of belief. We give two simple bisimulation relations for the modal language, one that respects non-falsity and one that respects the truth value. The doxastic logic axiomatized, apart from being interesting in its own right for KR applications, it comes with an underlying 3-valued propositional logic which is a syntactic (...) variant of the ‘logic of here-and-there’, whose importance in KR and Logic Programming is well-known, it is endowed from its very inception with a Gentzen-style proof theory from [Fit92] and a completeness theorem from [KNP02], it can be equivalently seen as a logic describing the epistemic agreement of two interrelated agents: a K45 agent who ‘dominates’ an S5 agent, as we show here, its satisfiability problem is NP-complete, i.e. at the lower level one can expect for applied logics. This is the first concrete example of an epistemic logic from Fitting's framework, that has been overlooked hitherto, despite its many attractive characteristics. (shrink)

In Metaphysics E. 3. 1027a29–30 Aristotle states that there are some causes, the incidental ones, that are generable and destructible but they have no coming to be. Furthermore, he asserts that if we deny this thesis, then we will have to give into determinism (1027a30–32). There are three persistent puzzles surrounding this chapter. First, what does it mean to say that a cause is generable and destructible but it has no coming to be? Second, what exactly is the connection between (...) this claim and determinism? And third, if we accept that in Metaphysics E. 3 Aristotle deals with incidental causation, then how is this discussion related to the treatment of incidentalness in E. 2? This article puts forward answers for these puzzles. I argue that there is textual evidence in Physics II. 5 that shows that the claim in Metaphysics 1027a29–30 is meant to capture the non-teleological nature of incidental causation. Moreover, I argue that this same textual evidence indicates that the thesis expressed at Metaphysics 1027a29–30 is in effect Aristotle’s response to teleological determinism. Finally, I suggest that it is plausible to suppose that chapter 3 does not quite belong with the rest of Metaphysics E. (shrink)

A paradigm shift in the human chronotoxicity of xenobiotics would study two‐sided desynchronized phenomena of interfacial interactions between cyclic or periodic environmental insults and the endogenous response and recovery profile. These systems‐based networks are under the influence of well‐synchronized biological clocks and their metabolic regulators. This perspective argues in favor of addressing the concept of synchronization in studies involving critical life windows of susceptibility, or circadian rhythms, or 24‐hour (periodic) diurnal rhythms and answering whether these disruptions in synchronization would affect (...) response and recovery or disease phenotypes associated with environmental insults, e.g., xenobiotics. Synchronization or synchrony is defined as the totality of elements that appear during the same time period within a system, including the network of interactions between the system's elements. Desynchronized interfaces during critical life windows or in time‐repeated exposure events would likely lead to initiating a cascade of adverse health effects associated with differentiated disease phenotypes. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the concepts ‘destination’, ‘revelation’, ‘foreknowledge’, ‘will’, ‘transmission’, ‘motion’, and ‘grace’, as they appear in Gregory Palamas’ treatise De opera-tionibus divinis. According to the Christian theologian, these terms correspond to specific ways of God’s manifestation, i.e. His natural and supernatural revelation. Since they illuminate God’s energies, but not His essence, they are participated by the beings of the natural world. The first two terms mainly refer to a general version of the revelation, while the third contains (...) epistemological elements as well and the fourth contains elements referring also to the divine will. The fifth term condenses the content of the afore-mentioned terms seen as an ad extra bestowment. By means of these concepts, Palamas preserves the ontological difference between the supernatural and the natural, while, at the same time, he defines the exact way of their communion, which excludes pantheism. He introduces into the divine realm the state of distinction, which, however, does not restrict its unity at all. He accepts the development of a metaphysical multitude, which is regulated by the divine uniqueness. What emerges is not a kind of Neoplatonic polytheism, but the infinite richness of the divine existence. Thus, Palamas steadily moves within the tradition founded by Ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor, John Damascene, and George Pachymeres, the main characteristic of which is ontological monism. This is a tradition which formulated common places as to the content, the concepts and the relevant methodology, while the distinction between negative and affirmative theology is dominant. (shrink)

There is an emerging consensus in the corporate social responsibility literature suggesting that the quest for the so-called business case for CSR should be abandoned. In the same vein, several researchers have suggested that future research should start examining not whether, but rather when CSR is likely to have strengthened, weakened or even nullified effects on organizational outcomes :69–74, 2012). Using perspectives from several theoretical frameworks, we contribute to the literature by empirically examining the tension between functional and sustainability attributes (...) in a novel context, namely that of green e-banking services. The findings indicate that the positive effect of CSR on users’ attitudes towards green e-banking services is moderated by two primarily utilitarian information systems factors—namely perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness—and an important utilitarian individual difference variable—namely perceived self-efficacy with technology. Our findings are also important if interpreted within the context of the ethical decision-making literature :375–413, 2005), as they indicate that the linkage between moral judgment and moral outcomes is unlikely to be that straightforward. (shrink)

Perceptual experience is one of our fundamental sources of epistemic justification—roughly, justification for believing that a proposition is true. The ability of perceptual experience to justify beliefs can nevertheless be questioned. This article focuses on an important challenge that arises from countenancing that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable. -/- The thesis of cognitive penetrability of perception states that the content of perceptual experience can be influenced by prior or concurrent psychological factors, such as beliefs, fears and desires. Advocates of this (...) thesis could for instance claim that your desire of having a tall daughter might influence your perception, so that she appears to you to be taller than she is. Although cognitive penetrability of perception is a controversial empirical hypothesis, it does not appear implausible. The possibility of its veracity has been adduced to challenge positions that maintain that perceptual experience has inherent justifying power. -/- This article presents some of the most influential positions in contemporary literature about whether cognitive penetration would undermine perceptual justification and why it would or would not do so. -/- Some sections of this article focus on phenomenal conservatism, a popular conception of epistemic justification that more than any other has been targeted with objections that adduce the cognitive penetrability of experience. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to articulate a distinction between habit and bodily skill as different ways of acting without deliberation. I start by elaborating on a distinction between habit and skill as different kinds of dispositions. Then I argue that this distinction has direct implications for the varieties of automaticity exhibited in habitual and skilful bodily acts. The argument suggests that paying close attention to the metaphysics of agency can help to articulate more precisely questions regarding the varieties (...) of automaticity exhibited in overt action. (shrink)

Combining philosophical and political analysis, this study offers a comprehensive reassessment of Castoriadis' contribution to critical theory in and through his critical confrontation with both the crisis of the traditional Left and the crisis of modern capitalist societies. The key concepts of 'crisis' and 'critique' are considered throughout the text and Castoriadis' ideas are situated in a critical debate with other radical thinkers, such as Lefort, Pannekoek, Arendt, Althusser, Axelos, Papaioannou and Marx. The study supplies an extensive analysis and explores (...) the contemporary relevance of Castoriadis' views regarding the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and the events of May 1968 in France. It argues for a re-radicalization of his thought in light of the current capitalist crisis and seeks to trace his radical alternative to crisis by critically examining and further elaborating his positions with respect to socialism, autonomy and revolution. (shrink)

A sample of 259 South African managers completed a survey originally administered by Nel (1992). The results of the current study indicated a favourable move on four of the 15 questionable actions used to assess each group's ethical predisposition. Furthermore, the grand means for the two temporal-based samples also provided anecdotal evidence of a positive transition. Virtually identical results were in evidence when the segment of 89 top managers was compared to the sample of its higher level peers from the (...) earlier study by Nel. The results support the premise that today's South African managers have a more ethical predisposition than did their peers of some 20 years prior to them. However, the study concurrently documents the reality that there is ample room for further improvement. (shrink)

An Introduction to basic metaepistemological debates and positions.

Several authors have argued that the things one does in the course of skilled and habitual activity present a difficult case for the ‘standard story’ of action. They are things intentionally done, but they do not seem to be suitably related to mental states. I suggest that once manifestations of habit are properly distinguished from exercises of skills and other kinds of spontaneous acts, we can see that habit raises a distinctive sort of problem. I examine certain responses that have (...) been given, as well as responses that could be given on behalf of the standard story to the problems presented by habitual activity. These responses rely on the idea of a kind of intention that does not ensue from conscious thought or deliberation. I raise three different objections to this line of response. The conclusion is that habit explains aspects of human behavior that cannot be accounted by ascribing intentions of any kind. (shrink)

Bill Pollard has recently developed an account of habits of action, endeavoring to rehabilitate the traditional notion of habit in a way that can be used to address current philosophical concerns. I argue that Pollard’s account has important shortcomings. The account is intended to apply indiscriminately to both habitual and skilled acts, but this overlooks crucial distinctions. Moreover, Pollard’s account fails to do justice to the various ways in which the idea of habit figures in the explanation and assessment of (...) action. These shortcomings are a consequence of certain assumptions Pollard shares with the accounts of mind and action he sets to criticize. As long as these assumptions are left intact, the potential of dispositional notions such as habit and skill to contribute to contemporary debates will not be realized. (shrink)

Metaepistemology Metaepistemology is, roughly, the branch of epistemology that asks questions about first-order epistemological questions. It inquires into fundamental aspects of epistemic theorizing like metaphysics, epistemology, semantics, agency, psychology, responsibility, reasons for belief, and beyond. So, if as traditionally conceived, epistemology is the theory of knowledge, metaepistemology is the theory of the theory of knowledge. … Continue reading Metaepistemology →.

Nielsen Busch and Mjaaland argue that controlled donation after circulatory death (DCD), and normothermic regional perfusion (NRP) do not violate the dead donor rule (DDR) (Nielsen Busch and Mjaala...

Volume 20, Issue 6, June 2020, Page 47-49.

Expressivism is a blossoming meta-semantic framework sometimes relying on what Carter and Chrisman call “the core expressivist maneuver.” That is, instead of asking about the nature of a certain kind of value, we should be asking about the nature of the value judgment in question. According to expressivists, this question substitution opens theoretical space for the elegant, economical, and explanatorily powerful expressivist treatment of the relevant domain. I argue, however, that experimental work in cognitive psychology can shed light on how (...) the core expressivist maneuver operates at the cognitive level and that this: raises worries about the aptness of the expressivist question substitution and supports an evolutionary debunking argument against expressivism. Since evolutionary debunking arguments are usually run in favor of expressivism, this creates an obvious puzzle for expressivists. I wrap up by briefly responding to the objection that the debunking argument against expressivism overgeneralizes and, therefore, should be rejected. (shrink)

A central argument against Ryle’s (The concept of mind, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1949) distinction between propositional and non propositional knowledge has relied on linguistic evidence. Stanley and Williamson (J Philos 98:411–444, 2001) have claimed that knowing-how ascriptions do not differ in any relevant syntactic or semantic respect from ascriptions of propositional knowledge, concluding thereby that knowing-how ascriptions attribute propositional knowledge, or a kind thereof. In this paper I examine the cross-linguistic basis of this argument. I focus on the (...) linguistic analysis of practical knowledge ascriptions in Modern Greek, although the issues raised are not restricted to one language. It is relatively straightforward to show that none of the three types of practical knowledge ascriptions in Modern Greek is an embedded question configuration, and hence Stanley and Williamson original claim is confined to certain languages only. This is not the end of the matter, however, since Stanley (Nous 45:207–238, 2011) argues that the equivalents of ‘knowing-how’ ascriptions in certain languages should be semantically analyzed as embedded questions despite their syntactic form. I argue that this fallback position faces a host of empirical and theoretical problems, in view of which it cannot bear the weight Stanley puts on it, supporting a conclusion about the kind of knowledge thereby attributed. (shrink)

The intellectual ferment that emerged in postwar France was marked by the renaissance of Hegel’s thought and the focus on Marx's early writings. In a parallel way, the death of Stalin, the uprising of 1953 in East Germany and the revolts in Hungary and Poland in 1956 provoked a thorough critique against the theory and practice of orthodox Marxism. The relationship between Marx and Marxism or the issue about the philosophical foundations of Marx’s thinking became the subject of long-standing controversy (...) and gave rise to several interpretations of Marx’s work. These debates were decisively fostered by the foreign intellectuals and refugees who arrived in France after the end of the Second World War; inter alia, a generation of young Greek intellectuals that included the prominent figures of Kostas Axelos, Cornelius Castoriadis and Kostas Papaioannou. This article focuses on Axelos’, Castoriadis’ and Papaioannou’s critique of Marx and provides an anti-critique of their intellectual endeavour. It outlines the common basis of their critical confrontation with the Marxian theorizing and argues that they interpreted Marx’s thought in a manner similar to orthodox Marxism. Despite the undoubted merits of their critique, they did not take it to all its theoretical and political conclusions. As a result, the horizons they opened lack radicalism and their dialogue with Marx was left open to being misunderstood. (shrink)

The goal of perception is to infer the most plausible source of sensory stimulation. Unisensory perception of temporal order, however, appears to require no inference, since the order of events can be uniquely determined from the order in which sensory signals arrive. Here we demonstrate a novel perceptual illusion that casts doubt on this intuition: in three studies (N=607) the experienced event timings are determined by causality in real-time. Adult observers viewed a simple three-item sequence ACB, which is typically remembered (...) as ABC (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2016), in line with principles of causality. When asked to indicate the time at which events B and C occurred, points of subjective simultaneity shifted so that the assumed cause B appeared earlier and the assumed effect C later, despite full attention and repeated viewings. This first demonstration of causality reversing perceived temporal order cannot be explained by post-perceptual distortion, lapsed attention, or saccades. (shrink)

The domain of agential powers is marked by a contrast that does not arise in the case of dispositions of inanimate objects: the contrast between propensities or tendencies on the one hand, and capacities or abilities on the other. According to Ryle (1949), this contrast plays an important role in the ‘logical geography’ of the dispositional concepts used in the explanation and assessment of action. However, most subsequent philosophers use the terms of art ‘power’ or ‘disposition’ indiscriminately in formulating central (...) metaphysical claims about human agency, assuming that an adequate account of inanimate dispositions can safely be used for such purposes. As a result, the distinctive features of propensities and capacities drop out of view. This is bound to obscure distinctions of crucial importance to the understanding of human agency. In order to show this, I undertake to articulate some central differences between propensities and capacities. Propensities and capacities have a different relation to value, as well as a concomitant difference in their metaphysical structure. The argument points to an explanation of why the distinction between propensities and capacities does not arise in the case of non-agential powers. This explanation takes us back to questions about the nature of human agency. (shrink)

In the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic, we created and implemented from November 2020 to February 2021 a monthly educational pilot program of philosophical management of stress based on Science, Humanism and Epicurean Pragmatism, which was offered to employees of 26 municipalities in the Prefecture of Attica, Greece. The program named “Philosophical Distress Management Operation System” (Philo.Di.M.O.S.) is novel and unique in its kind, as it combines a certain Greek philosophical tradition (Epicurean) that concurs with modern scientific knowledge. The (...) program was designed to be implemented in a period of crisis; therefore, it used a fast-paced, easy to learn and practice philosophical approach to stress management, based on cognitive psychotherapy. The philosophical approach to stress management has the advantage that it can be offered to most people, regardless of age and educational level. The pilot program was effective in achieving its objectives, shown by statistical comparisons of the trainees’ responses to anonymous questionnaires before and after the month-long training. The successful Philo.Di.M.O.S. program, thus, based on a solid scientific and philosophical basis, offers a paradigm of stress management during crises and could be useful in Greece and internationally. (shrink)

This book offers the first comprehensive assessment of Heidegger’s account of affective phenomena. Affective phenomena play a significant role in Heidegger’s philosophy — his analyses of mood significantly influenced diverse fields of research such as existentialism, hermeneutics, phenomenology, theology and cultural studies. Despite this, no single collection of essays has been exclusively dedicated to this theme. Comprising twelve innovative essays by leading Heidegger scholars, this volume skilfully explores the role that not only Angst plays in Heidegger’s work, but also love (...) and boredom. Exploring the nature of affective phenomena in Heidegger, as well as the role they play in wider philosophical debates, the volume is a valuable addition to Heideggerian scholarship and beyond, enriching current debates across disciplines on the nature of human agency. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose that economic sustainability is seen in terms of (inter-temporal and inter-national) value creation. We claim that value appropriation (or capture), can become a constraint to economic sustainability. We propose that for sustainable value creation to be fostered, corporate governance needs to be aligned to public and supra-national governance. In order to achieve this, a hierarchically layered set of ‘agencies’, needs to be diagnosed and the issue of incentive alignment addressed. Enlightened self-interest, pluralism and diversity, as (...) well as a representative supra-national organisation for world-wide economic sustainability can serve as a new, more ‘ethically correct’ governance for economic sustainability, but not a panacea. (shrink)

Most philosophers and psychologists assume that habitual acts do not ensue from deliberation, but are direct responses to the circumstances: habit essentially involves a variety of automaticity. My objective in this paper is to show that this view is unduly restrictive. A habit can explain an act in various ways. Pointing to the operation of automaticity is only one of them. I draw attention to the fact that acquired automaticity is one outgrowth of habituation that is relevant to explanation, but (...) not the only one. Habituation shapes our emotional and motivational make up in ways that affect deliberation itself. Hence mentioning a habit might be indispensable in explaining an act which nevertheless ensues from deliberation. The view that habitual acts are direct responses to the circumstances implies an impoverished conception of habit, which fails to do justice to its rich explanatory potential in theoretical and pre-theoretical contexts, as well as to its role in the history of philosophy. (shrink)